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ABSTRACT
This paper is concerned with the defense of deep models against adversarial attacks. Inspired by
the certificate defense approach, we propose a maximal adversarial distortion (MAD) optimization
method for robustifying deep networks. MAD captures the idea of increasing separability of class
clusters in the embedding space while decreasing the network sensitivity to small distortions. Given a
deep neural network (DNN) for a classification problem, an application of MAD optimization results
in MadNet, a version of the original network, now equipped with an adversarial defense mechanism.
MAD optimization is intuitive, effective and scalable, and the resulting MadNet can improve the
original accuracy. We present an extensive empirical study demonstrating that MadNet improves
adversarial robustness performance compared to state-of-the-art methods.
1 Introduction
Defending machine learning models from adversarial attacks has become an increasingly pressing issue as deep
neural networks (DNNs) are utilized in evermore facets of daily life. Adversarial attacks can effectively fool deep
models and force them to misclassify, using a slight but maliciously-designed distortion that, in the image domain, is
typically invisible to the human eye Szegedy et al. [2013], Goodfellow et al. [2014], Kurakin et al. [2016a], Carlini and
Wagner [2017b], Athalye et al. [2018]. Despite the advances in protecting against such attacks (see Section 4), defense
mechanisms are still wanting.
In this paper we study adversarial attacks through the lens of class activation geometry in embedding layers. We observe
that a trained deep classification model tends to organize instances into clusters in the embedding space, according to
class labels. Classes with clusters in close proximity to one another provide excellent opportunities for attackers to fool
the model. This activation geometry explains the tendency of untargeted attacks to alter the label of, for example, a
given image to that of an adjacent class in the embedding space. This observation is illustrated in Figure 1 as follows.
We trained Resnet-56 He et al. [2016] over the CIFAR-10 Krizhevsky and Hinton [2009] image dataset and calculated
the class centroids, computed using the L2 mean of class embeddings (pre-logits activation). Figure 1a depicts in colors
the distances between class centroids. For instance, the closest class to truck is automobile and the closest class to dog
is cat. We then attacked this network using the C&W (untargeted) attack Carlini and Wagner [2017a], and generated
many adversarial examples. Figure 1b depicts the class confusion matrix of this ResNet obtained by classifying the
adversarial instances. We see, for example, that images from class truck tend to be adversarialy perturbed so that they
are classified as automobile, as indicated by the red matrix cell, indicating a frequent label change between these classes.
Similarly, classes dog is classified as cat, also a frequent misclassification as a result of this attack. The Euclidean
distance provides only partial information about the identity of the adversarial class. In untargeted attacks in which the
attacker creates an adversarial example with no constraints on the adversarial class, performs a “step” in the direction of
the gradient. As such, the qualitative nature of the observation.
Such cluster geometry observations intuitively suggest that, by increasing the margin between clusters, we could make
the network more immune to attacks without compromising accuracy. Indeed manifestations of similar concepts have
already been considered in the context of large margin classification and generalization capabilities Sun et al. [2016],
Liang et al. [2017], Sokolic´ et al. [2017].
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(a) Embedding centroid proximity. L2 matrix of
ResNet-56 trained on CIFAR-10. The high value
in entry (i, j) indicates that class i is in close
proximity to class j in the embedding space.
(b) CIFAR-10 adversarial confusion matrix. The
high value in entry (i, j) represents successful
attacks, which change class i to class j.
Figure 1: CIFAR-10: DNN embedding distance matrix and C&W adversarial confusion matrix.
Here we present an adversarial defense method that captures the notion of increased separability in embedding space.
While increased separability motivations for defense methods appeared elsewhere Mustafa et al. [2019], the crux in
our method is that distances must be normalized by the network sensitivity in order to be meaningful. Otherwise, one
may get a false sense of separability in the embedding space with a network that travels large distances in this space in
response to tiny changes in the input space. This sensitivity can be quantified through a Lipschitz constant, or directly
via the Jacobian of the embedding layer with respect to the input.
Using a distortion , the adversary tried to compel a DNN F to misclassify x + , where x is an input. Ideal,
we want to maximize the  needed for this to succeed so that the adversary will fail when using a subtle attack.
Using first-order considerations, we propose an approximate lower bound on the effective distortion required by the
adversary, which motivates a useful strategy for adding a defense mechanism to any architecture. The first order bound,
 ≥ η(F )/||JF (x)||, which is similar to other known bounds Tsuzuku et al. [2018], is given in terms of η(F ), the
“embedding margin” of the network F , and JF (x), the Jacobian of F with respect to x (see details in Section 2). The
embedding margin, for a given intermediate layer, is the minimum distance between two instances belonging to two
different classes. This relation, which we call the maximal adversarial distortion (MAD) principle, motivates a MAD
optimization technique comprising a loss function and a training routine that maximizes this lower bound without
attempting to calculate it. While a large margin is intuitively a useful property that is widely accepted as an inducer of
robust classification Hoffer and Ailon [2015], Liu et al. [2016], Wen et al. [2016], the above relation emphasizes the
principle that the margin should be measured in terms of gradient of the model with respect to the input. Otherwise, a
large margin would be meaningless when small changes to the input correspond to large distances in the embedding
space.
To actualize the MAD approach, we introduce two procedures: one to increase the embedding margin, and another
for reducing the Jacobian. The margin is increased by both proxying and penalizing the in-between cluster distance
using the angular distance, and by explicitly penalizing within-cluster variance. The Jacobian is handled explicitly
by penalizing large embedding Jacobian norms. Both procedures are encapsulated in a single MAD optimization
procedure, using a Siamese-like training procedure. We refer to a network trained with the MAD optimization as
MadNet. An extensive empirical study of MadNet shows results under various threat models, in which we consider
FGSM, BIM, C&W and PGD attacks. Our experimental procedure adheres strictly to the comprehensive evaluation
desiderata proposed by Carlini et al. [2019]. The results we present indicate definitively that the proposed defense
method substantially improves state-of-the-art detection.
2 Maximal Adversarial Distortion (MAD)
In this section we develop the MAD principle, whose goal is to improve normalized separability between classes in
the embedding space. The MAD principle will be utilized in Section 3 to develop the MAD optimization approach
(loss function and training procedure). Let F be a neural classifier and let x ∈ Rh×w be an instance assumed to have
the class label c = c(x). Let  ∈ Rh×w be a vector representing an adversarial distortion for instance x such that the
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(successful) adversarial instance is xadv
M
= x+  whose label is different from c; namely, cadv
M
= F (xadv) 6= c. The
attacker’s goal is to find the smallest distortion  so that F misclassifies x,
min ||||
s.t. F (x+ ) 6= c(x) .
For a successful adversarial attack whose distortion is required to be small, in the spirit of Hein and Andriushchenko
[2017], Ding et al. [2018], Tsuzuku et al. [2018], Zhang et al. [2019], we approximate a prediction for xadv using the
first-order Taylor approximation,
F (xadv) = F (x+ )
||1≈ F (x) + JF (x),
which is applied here for tensor-valued functions with JF (x) being the Jacobian of F . The same approximation applies
to the output of any intermediate layer `. Denoting by F`(x) the output of layer `, we have,
F`(xadv) ≈ F`(x) + J`(x).
Taking the Forbenius norm, we get,
||J`(x)|| ≈ ||F`(x)− F`(xadv)||.
The Frobenius norm is sub-multiplicative (proof can be found in Appendix A) so that
||J`(x)|||||| ≥ ||J`(x)|| ≈ ||F`(x)− F`(xadv)||. (1)
For layer ` in F , we thus define its embedding margin,
η`(F )
M
= argmin
x1,x2,c(x1) 6=c(x2)
||F`(x1)− F`(x2)||,
and we have that
||J`(x)|||||| ≥ ||F`(x)− F`(xadv)|| ≥ η`(F ). (2)
Combining (2) and (1) (and ignoring the Taylor approximation error), we lower bound the norm of the distortion  in
terms of the embedding margin and the norm of the Jacobian,
|||| ≥ η`(F )||J`(x)|| . (3)
While the attacker’s goal is to find a small distortion leading to misclassification, our goal as the defender is to create a
resilient model that forces a maximal distortion. We refer to (3) as the maximal adversarial distortion (MAD) principle.
The MAD strategy is thus to explicitly maximize the right-hand side of (3) with respect to the embedding layer of
the model F . To successfully do so, we must increase the embedding margin ηl(F ) while decreasing the norm of the
Jacobian ||J`(x)||. Thus, the MAD principle tells us that the embedding margin must be measured in terms of gradient
units (gradients of the model with respect to the input), and it is meaningless to enlarge the embedding margin alone
without bounding the Jacobian.
3 Increasing Resiliency with MAD Optimization
In this section we describe the MAD optimization technique, which includes the MAD loss function and training routine.
The MAD loss function (presented below) is applied to the final embedding layer of a given network F . We note that,
technically, we can also apply the MAD procedure to any other layer in the model (or several layers simultaneously),
but defer such explorations to future work.
To apply the MAD principle (3), need increase the embedding margin η`(F ) and decrease the Jacobian norm ‖J`(x)‖.
We achieve the first objective by adopting ideas from classical cluster analysis. Specifically, we observe that the increase
in the embedding margin, ηl(F ), can be accomplished by increasing the distance between clusters and reducing their
variance. Let µc = 1Nc
∑Nc
i=1 z
c
i be the mean of each cluster, where Nc is the number of samples from class c and z
c
i is
the embedding vector of sample i from class c , and let M be the number of classes. We have that,
Cluster Variance M=
M∑
c=1
1
Nc
Nc∑
i=1
‖zci − µc‖2
Cluster Distance M=
1
M
M∑
c=1
1
M − 1
M∑
i 6=c
‖zi − µc‖2 .
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To increase the margin, we would like to minimize the following objective,
Margin Objective = Cluster Variance− Cluster Distance.
Unlike the cluster variance, maximization of the cluster distance is problematic because the distance is potentially
unbounded. We can, however, proxy this quantity using the angular distance between clusters, which is bounded. To
this end, we use the cosine similarity and utilize a Siamese training procedure, as described in Section 3.1.
3.1 MAD Optimization Components
To explicitly increase the embedding margin, we propose using Siamese training as follows. We create a Siamese
network Bromley et al. [1994], where each subnetwork is our classifier F . The Siamese network receives two input
instances denoted by xci , x
c˜
j , and generates three outputs: two classification outputs and one auxiliary output for the
cosine similarity between each subnetwork’s embedding. We introduce an additional loss term to force embeddings
from different class samples to have a cosine similarity of 0 (and 1 otherwise). Formally,
SiameseLoss M=
zci · zc˜j
‖zci‖
∥∥zc˜j∥∥ =
{
1, if c = c˜ ;
0, else .
Inspired by Szegedy et al. [2016], we include an additional loss term that penalizes each class cluster individually for
large variance. We refer to this component as the “reduce variance loss” (RVL). Formally,
σc
M
=
1
Nc
Nc∑
i=1
‖zci − µc‖2, RVL M=
1
Nc
Nclasses∑
c=1
σc. (4)
The variance is estimated per class on each mini-batch, then averaged and minimized as part of the learning process.
Finally, we add a Jacobian reduction loss, which explicitly evaluates the Jacobian per mini-batch, and include its norm
in the DNN’s loss function. Formally, J`(x) =
∂F`(x)
∂x , where the derivative is taken for each input in a mini-batch. To
minimize the norm of the Jacobian, we include it in the MAD loss function.
3.2 Training with MAD Optimization
A simultaneous application of all components described above is obtained using the following MAD loss function,
denoted LMAD,
LMAD(x1, x2, y1, y2;F ) M= λCECE(x1, y1;F ) + λCECE(x2, y2;F )
+ λSiam
(
δy1,y2 −
z1z2
‖z1‖ ‖z2‖
)2
+ λRVL
1
Nc
Nclasses∑
c=1
σc(x1) + λRVL
1
Nc
Nclasses∑
c=1
σc(x2)
+ λJacob
∥∥∥∥∂F (x1)∂x1
∥∥∥∥+ λJacob ∥∥∥∥∂F (x2)∂x2
∥∥∥∥ ,
where CE(x, y;F ) is the cross-entropy loss of x given its label y, and λCE, λRVL, λSiam, and λJacob are hyperparameters
(taken in our experiments to be 1, 1, 1, 0.01, respectively).1 In addition, we require a specialized mini-batch construction
procedure. A pseudo-code of the training procedure is given in Algorithm 1 in Appendix B. The code is self-explanatory
for the most part. We note, however, that an epoch begins by creating a Siamese counterpart for each instance–label pair
in a given batch. With probability Q, the Siamese sample is selected from the same class, and its cosine similarity label
is set to 1. Otherwise (probability 1−Q), the Siamese sample is selected from a different class, and its cosine similarity
label is set to 0. Both target classes’ activation is set to α, a label smoothing hyperparameter (see Appendix F). Notice
that the Siamese, RVL and Jacobian norm (Equation 4) components are computed from the embedding vectors of each
mini-batch.
1 λJacob = 0.01 was chosen to make this component roughly of the same magnitude as the other components.
4
MadNet: Using a MAD Optimization for Defending Against Adversarial Attacks
4 Related Work
Many interesting ideas have been proposed to construct defense mechanisms against adversarial examples. These
can be broadly divided into two categories. The first are active algorithms that process the input or output of the
DNN at prediction time, removing the effects of the adversarial algorithm. Amongst these algorithms are: Neural
Fingerprinting Dathathri et al. [2018], that transforms the DNN’s input such that a specific, pre-defined prediction is
expected; Stochastic Adversarial Pruning Dhillon et al. [2018], that adds a randomized, dropout-like mechanism to the
prediction process; and others. The second category, to which the algorithm presented in this paper belongs, is that of
passive defense algorithms. Such algorithms alter the DNN’s training process, loss function or architecture to create a
network that is more robust to adversarial attacks. One popular passive approach is adversarial training Goodfellow et al.
[2014], Madry et al. [2017], Yan et al. [2018], where adversarial examples are introduced during the training procedure,
making the DNN more robust to perturbations in the input instance. Another approach is the ensemble approach Tramèr
et al. [2017], Strauss et al. [2017], Pang et al. [2019] where, instead of training a single predictor, the training process
includes several different DNNs, all trained together with a single loss function that collects the predictions.
A formal approach to adversarial defense is the certification approach Hein and Andriushchenko [2017], which is
designed to provide a lower bound for the penetration distortion attempting to fool a given network. Certified defense
methods are referred to as being either “exact” or “conservative”. In exact methods, no distortion smaller than the
certification bound can penetrate or confuse the DNN Hein and Andriushchenko [2017], Wong and Kolter [2017],
Wong et al. [2018], Cohen et al. [2019]. In conservative methods, the bound is merely a relative metric for comparing
DNN robustness to adversarial examples Ding et al. [2018], Tsuzuku et al. [2018], Zhang et al. [2019]. Both exact and
conservative methods have been criticized for being computationally expensive and unscalable. Tjeng et al. [2018],
Cohen et al. [2019]. Moreover, so far these techniques have lacked in performance. In contrast, our pragmatic approach
that relies on a lower bound approximation, does not provide a theoretical guarantee but leads to excellent performance.
Improving the separability of the class clusters in the intermediate layers of a DNN as a mean of defending against
adversarial attack is a notion established by Hein and Andriushchenko [2017]. Following their work, many defense
methods have been suggested to increase the margin between classes while maintaining a feasible training process so
as to be applicable to large-scale DNNs. Liu et al. [2016] and Wang et al. [2018] added an angular constraint to the
loss function, forcing a large angular distance between classes. Elsayed et al. [2018] suggested a margin increasing
loss function that explicitly aims to increase the distance between class clusters, truncating the maximal distance given
that increasing the distance is an unbounded term. Mustafa et al. [2019] suggested arranging the features of each class
in specific convex polytopes. To that end, they employed an auxiliary loss function based on the distance between
instance features and a p-norm ball around the class centroid. Chan et al. [2019] presented the Jacobian Adversarially
Regularized Networks (JARN) method in which they imposed constraints on the DNN’s Jacobian and showed their
impact on the DNN’s robustness to adversarial attacks. In contrast, our MAD principle (Section 2) states that separability
and Jacobian must be optimized together so that separability is gradient-normalized, and it is sub-optimal to consider
each of these quantities individually.
5 Experimental Evaluation
We now evalate the merit of our MadNet approach as a defence mechanism against adversarial attacks. We start by
describing the experimental setup, including the precise specification of what the adversary knows and can do. We then
present qualitative insight on the embedding separability of MadNets, followed by detailed quantitative evaluation in
the face of varied attacks.
5.1 Experimental Setup
Following Mustafa et al. [2019], Pang et al. [2019], Chan et al. [2019], Elsayed et al. [2018], we evaluated MadNet
on three image datasets: MNIST LeCun et al. [1998], CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 Krizhevsky and Hinton [2009]. We
tested four different attacks: FGSM, BIM, PGD and C&W. For PGD and BIM we used 10 iterations and several values
of the maximal L∞ perturbation , in line with the perturbation used by the baseline Mustafa et al. [2019]. A detailed
description of the different attacks can be found in Appendix D. We chose ResNet-56 He et al. [2016] as the backbone
architechture of MadNet. A full description of the training parameters can be found in Appendix C. We compare our
results to the vanilla ResNet-56 baseline trained with cross-entropy, denoted as CE, and to robustness results presented
by Mustafa et al. [2019]. In their work, they conducted a thorough ablation study and were able to surpass Madry
et al. [2017], Yu et al. [2018], Kurakin et al. [2016b], Ross and Doshi-Velez [2018]. As such, we consider their work
as the current state-of-the-art, under a similar threat model and test for the attacks and under the same parameter
setting as in their ablation study. For the C&W attack we used 1000 iterations with the confidence set to 0 and various
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(a) CE; DBI =0.98 (b) MadNet; DBI = 0.1
Figure 2: CIFAR-10 t-SNE and Davies–Bouldin Index (DBI) for CE and MadNet.
values of the initial constant c. We also apply a maximal L∞ perturbation as done by Mustafa et al. [2019], setting the
maximal perturbation to 0.3 for MNIST and 0.03 for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. Results are reported as the accuracy,
in percentage, on 1000 adversarially perturbed images, taken from the test set, which were correctly classified prior to
the perturbation.
To evaluate a defense algorithm’s efficiency against these adversarial attacks, we consider two threat models, dif-
ferentiated by the knowledge the adversary has of the classifier (target network) and the defense mechanism being
used.
Black-Box Threat Model: In this model, the adversary has no knowledge of our system. It does not know the target
network architecture, cannot access its gradients and does not know the defense methods. The adversary can, however,
sample the target network for input-output pairs and has access to the dataset used to train the target network.
White-Box Threat Model: In this model, we assume the adversary has full knowledge of the entire system to be
attacked, and can access its gradients to produce the adversarial example. We tested the black-box and white-box threat
models on each dataset.
5.2 Qualitative Observations on Embedding Separability
Using t-SNE Maaten and Hinton [2008] to visualize the embedding space activations, Figure 2 illustrates how MAD
optimization affects the separability of class embedding clusters. Figure 2a depicts class clusters in the embedding layer
after standard training over CIFAR-10 (without MAD). Figure 2b shows the clusters obtained when using a complete
MAD optimization, which also includes Jacobian reduction. We note that t-SNE is mainly useful for visualization
and can often distort the overall relationships in high dimensions. To obtain a reliable ablation study, we calculated
the Davies–Bouldin index (DBI) Davies and Bouldin [1979], which is frequently used to evaluate clustering quality
according to the distance between cluster centroids divided by the Euclidean distance between points within a cluster (a
lower score means better clustering). DBI scores are shown for all four embedding clusterings in Figure 2. It is evident
that each MAD optimization component contributes significantly to separability, and the DBI of a complete MAD
optimization is the best by far.
5.3 White-Box Study
For the white-box threat model we consider MadNet with two training procedures. The first is where only normal
samples are introduced during the training process. The second is adversarial training where we use the PGD attack
during the training of MadNet, and introduce adversarial examples in the training process. Results for the white-box
threat model appear in Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3, with the best method without adversarial training highlighted in
green, and the best method with adversarial training in blue. Examining these tables, we first note that MadNet does not
significantly degrade the performance on normal instances and even improves it for CIFAR-10 (first row in the table).
It is evident that MadNet outperforms the competition on the vast majority of the scenarios tested, especially when
using adversarial training, improving the results even for attacks not introduced during training. Moreover, MadNet’s
performance on MNIST with adversarial training displays near perfect results, creating an almost impenetrable model.
MadNet’s performance on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 indicates that it is appropriate for more complex images than
MNIST as well as for a larger number of classes. We note that the significantly better performance for higher-constant
C&W is partially caused by the L∞ bound imposed. When the L∞ constraint is removed, MadNet achieves an accuracy
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of 71.6% with adversarial training and 67.2% without for MNIST with c = 10, and 61.5% with adversarial training for
CIFAR-10 with c = 0.1. Other C&W scenarios were not significantly affected by this constraint.
Table 1: MNIST adversarial robustness (%) under the white-box threat model.
Attack CE Mustafa et al. MadNet Mustafa et al.Adv training
MadNet
Adv training
No Attack 99.22 99.5 99.3 99.3 99.3
C&W (c = 0.1) 31.6 97.7 98.3 97.6 99.4
C&W (c = 1) 0 80.4 93.1 91.2 98.1
C&W (c = 10) 0 29.1 92.5 46.0 97.9
FGSM( = 0.1) 74 97.1 95.3 96.5 98.3
FGSM( = 0.2) 23 70.6 73.5 77.9 95.8
BIM( = 0.1) 17.4 90.2 92.2 92.1 98.6
BIM( = 0.15) 3.4 70.6 87 77.3 95.2
PGD ( = 0.1) 10.6 83.6 92.4 93.9 98.8
PGD ( = 0.15) 0.6 62.5 83.4 80.2 98.4
Table 2: CIFAR-10 adversarial robustness (%) under the white-box threat model.
Attack CE Mustafa et al. MadNet Mustafa et al.Adv training
MadNet
Adv training
No-Attack 93 90.5 94.2 91.9 92.1
CW (c = 0.001) 30.5 84.3 79.3 91.3 93.4
CW (c = 0.01) 0 63.5 68.5 73.7 92.4
CW (c = 0.1) 0 41.1 63.7 60.5 81.2
FGSM( = 0.02) 23.5 72.5 70.6 78.5 76.1
FGSM( = 0.04) 16.3 56.3 63.3 69.9 70.3
BIM( = 0.01) 0 62.9 68.4 74.5 77.2
BIM( = 0.02) 0 40.1 53.4 57.3 54.8
PGD ( = 0.01) 0 60.1 68.8 75.7 85
PGD ( = 0.02) 0 39.3 55.2 58.5 60.2
Table 3: CIFAR-100 adversarial robustness (%) under the white-box threat model.
Attack CE Mustafa et al. MadNet Mustafa et al.Adv training
MadNet
Adv training
No-Attack 72.3 71.9 71.1 68.3 66.7
BIM( = 0.005) 4 44.8 46.8 55.7 78.1
BIM( = 0.01) 1 39.8 31.2 46.9 62.8
PGD ( = 0.005) 8 42.2 53.4 55 76
PGD ( = 0.01) 1 38.9 33.5 44 63.1
5.4 Black-Box Study
To evaluate our model in the black-box threat model, where the attacker cannot access the model’s weights, we followed
Papernot et al. [2017], Carlini et al. [2019] and created a proxy model, which was trained using input-output pairs probed
from the defender’s (target) model (i.e., the proxy model was trained via teacher-student distillation of the target model).
The proxy model was then used by the attacker to generate adversarial examples under the white-box threat model.
These adversarial examples were then tested against the target model. The proxy model we chose was ResNet-32. One
main purpose of the black-box threat model is to check for obfuscated gradients. In their paper, Athalye et al. [2018]
listed defense methods that mask or obstruct the DNN’s gradients. As such, when the attacking algorithms attempts to
create an adversarial example it fails to do so, simply because of its inability to properly derive the DNN’s output w.r.t
its input. This might give a false sense of security since with slight modifications of the attacks, these defenses can be
overcome. If a defense method performs better under the white-box threat model, this would indicate an obfuscation
of gradients. The adversarial robustness results under the black-box threat model appear in Table 4. As expected, the
black-box threat model’s performance is superior to that of the white-box threat model achieving, for example, 97.6%,
95.7% and 78.3% against the black-box PGD attack on MNIST, CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 respectively vs 92.4%,
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Table 4: Adversarial robustness (%) for MadNet under the black-box threat model.
Attack MNIST
 = 0.1 , c = 0.1
CIFAR-10
 = 0.02 , c = 0.001
CIFAR-100
 = 0.01
CE
FGSM 74.2 51.3 61.5
BIM 81.7 49.1 44.3
PGD 78.3 57.8 47.2
C&W 94.3 92.3 95.2
MAD
FGSM 98.1 85.1 80.8
BIM 98 96.3 79.8
PGD 97.6 95.7 78.3
C&W 100 100 98
68.8 and 33.5% against its white-box counterpart. While this alone does not guarantee the gradients are not masked or
manipulated, we argue that the components that constitute the MAD loss do not impose any constraints on the model’s
gradients other than the derivation for the Jacobian reduction, a process that also occurs when performing standard
adversarial training.
6 Conclusions
We introduced maximum adversarial distortion (MAD), a powerful approach for the defense of deep models against
adversarial attacks by optimizing for sensitivity-normalized embedding separability. We demonstrated state-of-the-art
results in defending against adversarial attacks. In addition, we provided some geometric intuition on attacks and
defenses using both Davies–Bouldin Index analysis and t-SNE visualizations. This work raises several interesting
questions. First, it would be valuable to examine other methods for margin maximization and Jacobian reduction. For
example, a recent work by Zhang et al. [2019] proposed an iterative technique to reduce the norm of the Jacobian. In
addition, it would also be interesting to explore ways to increase the margin (and reduce the Jacobian) on shallower
embedding layers where lower-level features are formed. Finally, our MAD approach utilized a first-order approximation
and ignored the Taylor approximation error term, which can be bounded in terms of ‖H`(x)‖ and ‖‖2, where H` is the
Hessian of the embedding layer with respect to the input. It would be valuable to try and further robustify networks by
also accounting for this error term.
Broader Impact
In this paper we present a strong defense method against adversarial attacks. As such, the paper potentially has a
positive societal effect because defense techniques constitute our only countermeasure against malicious attempts
to fool deep learning systems that help or serve the public. We are unable to identify negative consequences of the
proposed algorithms.
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Appendices
A L2 Norm Sub-Multiplicativity
Given A ∈ RN×M×K and B ∈ RK×J×L, we claim that the Frobenius norm of the multiplication of A and B is less
than or equal to the multiplication of each tensor’s Frobenius norm. Proof:
‖AB‖2F =
N∑
n=1
M∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
L∑
l=1
∣∣∣∣∣
K∑
k=1
an,m,kbk,j,l
∣∣∣∣∣
2
6
N∑
n=1
M∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
L∑
l=1
K∑
k=1
|an,m,k|2
K∑
k=1
|bk,j,l|2 (Cauchy-Schwarz)
=
N∑
n=1
M∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
L∑
l=1
(
K∑
k,s=1
|an,m,k|2 |bk,j,l|2)
=
N∑
n=1
M∑
m=1
K∑
k=1
|an,m,k|2
J∑
j=1
L∑
l=1
K∑
s=1
|bs,j,l|2 (5)
= ‖A‖2F ‖B‖2F
B MAD Algorithm
The MAD algorithm appears in Algorithm 1.
C Classifier Hyperparameters
Parameter Value
Optimizer SGD
ResNet Depth 56
Weight Regularization L2 (0.002)
Batch Size 128
Initial Learning Rate 0.1
Epochs-CIFAR-10 400
Epochs-MNIST 80
Activation Leaky-Relu (0.1)
λCE 1
λsiam 1
λRVL 1
λJacobian 0.01
α 0.8
D Adversarial Attacks
We use various attack algorithms to evaluate our defense method. We denote x,x′ as the input and adversarial instance,
respectively, ` as the target label, F as the target model with loss function LF (x, `) and  = ||x− x′|| as the pixel-wise
perturbation between the adversarial and normal instances. The general formulation, therefore, becomes,
minimize
x′
||x− x′||2 s.t. F (x′) = `. (6)
FGSM: Goodfellow et al. [2014] introduced the fast gradient sign method (FGSM), which optimizes the adversarial
instance by back-propagating the input through the attacked DNN, in accordance with the desired target. Formally,
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Algorithm 1 MadNet optimization
1: procedure MAD
2: for batch = 1, . . . ,#batches do
3: X,Y ← get_batch()
4: initialize Xsiamese = [], Ysiamese = [], S = []
5: for b = 1, . . . , batch_size do
6: q ∼ Bernoulli(Q)
7: if q == 1 then
8: y ← Y [b]
9: s← 1
10: else
11: y ← random class 6= y1
12: s← 0
13: end if
14: x← random sample from class Y [b]
15: Append x, y, s to Xsiamese, Ysiamese, S
16: end for
17: z1, z2 ← F`(X), F`Xsiamese) . embedding
18: p1, p2 ← F (X), F (Xsiamese) . logits
19: SL = 1batch_size
∑ | z1z2‖z1‖‖z2‖ − S|
20: RV L← 0
21: JL←
∥∥∥∂F (x1)∂x1 ∥∥∥+ ∥∥∥∂F (x2)∂x2 ∥∥∥
22: for c = 0, . . . ,M do
23: µc =
1
Nc
∑Nc
i=1 z
c
i
24: σc =
1
Nc
∑Nc
i=1 ‖zci − µc‖2
25: RVL← RVL + σc
26: end for
27: minimize LMAD
28: end for
29: end procedure
letting  be a fixed parameter, the adversarial example is,
x′ = x+  sign(∇LF (x, `). (7)
While not as effective as other attack algorithms, this method has the advantage of being one of the fastest ones.
BIM: Kurakin et al. [2016a] introduced the Basic Iterative Method (BIM), which performs the FGSM method iteratively,
clipping the perturbation if needed. Formally,
x′N+1 = x
′
N +  sign(∇LF (x′N , l)),
where  is a fixed parameter.
PGD: Madry et al. [2017] proposed an attack similar to BIM, performing FGSM steps from a sample randomly selected
from a neighbourhood of x .
C&W: Carlini and Wagner [2017b] introduced the C&W method, which operates by modifying the L-BFGS method as
follows,
minimize
x′
||x− x′||2 + cf(x′),
where c is a hyperparameter and the loss function, f , is chosen such that f(x′) <= 0 if x′ is classified as the target
class; namely,
f(x′) = max(Z(x′)` − Z(x′)t, κ)
where Z is the target DNN logits, t is the correct label and κ is a hyperparameter referring to the confidence of the attack.
The higher the confidence, the higher the activation for the target class is, and therefore, the larger the perturbation.
Three different Euclidean norms are considered with this algorithm, L0, L2, L∞. We conduct our evaluation using
L2. This attack method is considered very effective and has had great success in overcoming various defense methods
Papernot et al. [2016], Carlini and Wagner [2017b].
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E Adversarial Attack Parameters
The parameters chosen to create the adversarial examples per attack are given in Table 5.
Table 5: Adversarial attack parameters.
Attack Parameter Value
BIM Iterations 10
PGD Iterations 10
CW Max Iterations 1000
Binary Search Steps 1
Confidence 0
F Label Smoothing
Label smoothing, the process of training a DNN with soft labels rather than a one-hot vector, has been shown to decrease
the gradients w.r.t. the model’s weights Müller et al. [2019], while not directly used in the context of adversarial
robustness. Intuitively, the “cost” of an incorrect prediction is lower when the target label’s activation is lower than
1. As such, the update increment of the weights is lower than in standard one-hot training. By the same logic, if
we consider the weights fixed and the input instance as being updated according to a gradient step, as is the basis of
adversarial attacks, we can deduce that the gradients will be lower than those of a standard training procedure. We set
the softmax response of the correct class to α and the remaining classes are distributed evenly to sum to 1.
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